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1 Introduction and Motivation
The Road Not Taken
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I–
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.
–Frost (1920)
This paper aims to test the claim implicit in Frost’s poem.1 If we think of
Frost’s “roads” as career paths, how important is road choice to well-being? How
important is a chosen road’s idiosyncratic fit, of finding the road best suited to
idiosyncratic tastes and skills? In the language of economists, how much money
would an individual demand to accept another road? We use a model of road
choice to estimate the distribution of road quality options.
The influence of idiosyncratic taste and skill on career choice is important for
a few reasons. To the degree that idiosyncratic career taste affects career choice,
workers who are forced to change careers may face substantial welfare costs be-
yond their well-studied forgone income (see Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993),
Ruhm (1991), and Couch and Placzek (2010) as just a few examples). Similarly,
government programs that provide training in a particular career (LaLonde (1995),
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (2005)) may be of limited value if the individuals
assigned to that program lack interest in or aptitude for that career.
Such a model for career choice is challenging for three reasons. First and most
obviously, we never observe the full choice set; we observe only the career that was
chosen, but not the (presumably inferior) options that were not chosen.2 Second,
1In fact, a large body of poetry criticism argues that Frost’s intended meaning was not the literal
and commonly believed one (Pritchard, 1984). Scholars note “Frost’s decision to make his two
roads not very much different from one another, for passing over one of them had the effect of
wearing them ‘really about the same.’”(Monteiro, 1988)
2This is merely a career choice application of the classic problem of measuring treatment effects
(surveyed in Holland, 1986).
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data on a chosen career’s attributes may be limited. Third, career choice decisions
depend substantively on non-pecuniary factors (e.g. working conditions, interest
in the work, etc.) that economists typically don’t observe and about which we have
few interesting, quantitative hypotheses.
We overcome these problems using variables we do observe and about which
we have well-developed models: a chosen career’s income risk and a person’s
coefficient of relative risk aversion. Expected utility provides a quantitative theory
of the dollar equivalent cost of a given level of income risk for a person with a given
level of risk aversion. While risk-related variables may affect career choice, they
are hardly the only drivers of such choice. We use them to identify the importance
of other factors, including the unobservable ones that we model as idiosyncratic.
This is possible if we assume that risk aversion is an attribute of a person (and
therefore not affected by the career they choose) and income risk is an attribute of
a career (and therefore not affected by the risk aversion of the person who chooses
it).
We envision a model in which people are endowed with a preference for risk
and level of overall ability, broadly conceived as risk-free, career-independent earn-
ing potential. Careers differ in income risk and typical, worker-independent pay.
We allow individuals to have idiosyncratic taste for – or skill and correspondingly
higher pay in – some careers over others. Income risk is resolved after the career
is chosen, though workers know careers’ risks when they choose a career. Both ca-
reers and individuals may differ in other attributes, which may be unobservable to
the econometrician though all are observable to workers. We abstract from search
frictions and bounded rationality concerns; workers observe and understand the
full set of career options from which they can choose. In section 5.4 we show how
our results may be reinterpreted as the welfare cost of search frictions as opposed
to the importance of idiosyncratic taste and skill. We also abstract from intertem-
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poral concerns; workers chose careers only once. Unfortunately, data does not
exist which could identify a dynamic version of our model. We have neither the
data to estimate the time-series of risk-aversion, nor a compelling way to identify
risk-related career changes.
Figure 1 shows that, ceteris paribus, the relationship between income risk and
risk-aversion will be weakly negatively monotonic; risk tolerant individuals will
choose the riskiest careers (which will carry a compensating wage differential for
income risk) while risk intolerant individuals will choose the safest careers.3 The
local risk-return trade-off (the marginal risk premium) is determined by the risk-
aversion (slope of the risk-return indifference curve) of the marginal individual
at that quantity of risk. There is already a large empirical and theoretical litera-
ture on this risk-return relationship.4 We aim to see if this well-studied and well-
understood risk-return relationship can be used to identify other parameters in a
career choice model. In particular, we identify the importance of idiosyncratic taste
and skill from the risk-based mismatch of risk-averse people into risky careers.
Idiosyncratic tastes and skills will lead some highly risk-averse people to choose
careers with high income risk and some risk-tolerant people to choose careers with
low income risk. Expected utility gives the welfare cost of deviating from an antic-
ipated income risk choice for someone with a given risk preference. By observing
the distribution of these deviations we can back out the dollar-equivalent value of
the idiosyncratic tastes or skills that made these deviations optimal. The disper-
3Deleire and Levy (2004) present a similar figure in which people with heterogeneous preference
for injury (not income risk) sort into safer and riskier (by probability of injury) jobs.
4Weiss (1972) and Pacios-Huerta (2003) identify the risk attributes associated with various de-
mographic groups. Hartog, Plug, Diaz-Serrano, and Vieira (2003), Hartog and Vijverberg (2007),
and Berkhout, Hartog, and Webbink (2006) estimate “risk-augmented Mincer (1974) equations”
(surveyed in Hartog (2009)) to identify the empirical risk-return relationship; Berkhout, Hartog,
and Webbink (2006) allow this relationship to vary with demographic characteristics. Flyer (2004)
identifies the impact of income risk on occupational choice (while Harris and Weiss (1984) provide
a theory of such a choice); Diaz-Serrano and Hartog (2006) do the same for educational choice
(with Levhari and Weiss (1974) and Krebs (2003) providing theory on this).
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Figure 1: Sorting of the Risk Tolerant into Volatile Careers
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Indifference Curve 
 
Income Volatility 
Expected Income 
0 
Ability/Risk-free 
earning potential 
Figure 1 presents a stylized risk-return menu. The solid curve represents the menu of risk-return
options, which has a positive slope reflecting the increased compensation for taking higher income
risk. The dashed curve represents the indifference curve of a more risk-tolerant individual, while
the dotted curve represents the indifference curve of a more risk-averse individual. Tangencies
reflect the optimal decision of each individual for the given risk-return menu.
sion of idiosyncratic taste and skill is identified from shifts in the distribution of
income risk as risk-aversion changes. The tighter the correlation between income
risk and risk aversion, the lower the implied dispersion of idiosyncratic taste and
skill. We estimate a lower bound of 44% of income on the standard deviation of
these idiosyncratic factors.
The model provides a clean mapping from a feature of the data to an a priori
seemingly unrelated parameter. The feature of the data is the degree to which the
distribution of chosen income risk shifts with risk aversion; the parameter is the
importance (formally, the standard deviation as expressed in log-income equiva-
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lent units) of idiosyncratic taste for or skill in one career over another. The model
implies that a variety of nuisance parameters, such as the distribution of career op-
tions and their quality, are absorbed by the distribution of income risk chosen by
risk neutral people; the key parameter of interest is identified only from the shift
in that distribution as risk-aversion increases.
This framework provides an application for the recent literature on heterogene-
ity in income volatility. Income volatility is frequently used as a proxy for income
risk. Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and Alvarez, Browning, and Ejrnaes (2001) show
that income volatility differs across individuals. Jensen and Shore (2009a,b) esti-
mate the distribution of ex-ante, individual-specific volatilities in the population.
The 1996 PSID includes a measure of self-reported risk tolerance, elicited from a
survey asking the individual if they would take a series of hypothetical income
gambles (Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro, 1997; Sahm, 2007; Kimball, Sahm,
and Shapiro, 2008, 2009). We merge these risk-aversion values with estimates of
individuals’ volatilities in the PSID, both from Jensen and Shore (2009a,b) and also
from Meghir and Pistaferri (2004). Individuals who self-identify as risk tolerant
tend to have more volatile income streams. At the same time, we observe a non-
degenerate joint distribution of income volatility and risk tolerance; conditional on
observed risk tolerance, individuals choose a wide variety of income volatilities.
Our parametric and statistical assumptions imply a logit structure (McFadden,
1974). Logit models have long been used in the reduced-form occupational choice
literature to study the relative importance of covariates on choice from a finite list
of observed careers (Boskin, 2004; Field, 2009). Without an economic model, the
multinomial logit setting can be identified only up to a normalization: doubling
the utility from all careers (doubling all coefficients and the error term) has no
effect on career choice. Our model provides a cardinalization of a logit model
of career risk choice, so that all estimates can be expressed in terms of their (log)
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certainty equivalents.56 Because we assume a continuum of careers, our model
has the continuous logit structure previously used to study home location choice
(Ben-Akiva, Litinas, and Tsunokawa, 1985). In the housing application, there is
effectively a continuum of homes located on a two-dimensional plane; while re-
searchers may observe few home attributes, they do observe the home’s location
in this plane. In our setting, we don’t observe the exact chosen career, but we
observe where that career is located along an income risk “line.”7
Naturally, our cardinalization inherits the econometric limitations of any logit
model; anything that will bias logit coefficient estimates will be a problem for us.
Most significantly, we require that risk aversion is associated with a person, and
income risk is associated with a career. In truth, income risk may depend on unob-
servable individual attributes as well, and might be correlated with risk-aversion.
In this case, to the degree that risk-averse people will make any career less risky,
our estimates of the variance of idiosyncratic factors will be biased downward and
5Keane and Wolpin (1997) provides an alternative – and very different – cardinalization within a
model of optimal educational investment and subsequent choice from five broad career categories.
6The common reduced-form alternative is to use pay as one of the covariates that influences
occupational choice, giving other coefficients a dollar-equivalent interpretation (Willis and Rosen,
1979; Robertson and Symons, 1990; Siow, 1984). This alternative assumes away the problem that
we do not observe occupational pay, but rather the pay of those who choose an occupation. High
pay in a given occupation may reflect not just high pay for that occupation but also high ability (or
idiosyncratic individual-career-specific skill) among those who choose that occupation. In some
sense, this assumption is the first-moment analog to the one we make in this paper; we assume that
income risk (the second moment of pay) is associated with a career and not the person that chooses
this career; to use pay as a numeraire, we must assume that expected pay (the first moment of pay)
is associated with a career and not the person who chooses that career.
Dynamic data can be used to overcome the problem that ability may be correlated with pay; pay
changes resulting from occupational changes can be used to estimate career-specific effects holding
overall individual ability fixed (Stinebrickner, 2001). This approach does not tackle the problem
that idiosyncratic individual-career-specific skill may change at such transitions, with some careers
systematically receiving workers for whom that career is a better “fit”.
7While most papers on occupational choice rely on choice from a finite and specified list of
occupational options, some papers allow the number of occupations to be very large, using occu-
pational categories primarily to identify the attributes of chosen careers. For example, Deleire and
Levy (2004) use 46 occupational codes to map their occupational attribute of interest (injury and
fatality risk) to individuals who choose those occupations. In our case, panel data allow us to ob-
tain individual-specific estimates of our career attribute of interest (income volatility as a measure
of income risk), so we can examine career attribute choice without explicitly observing the chosen
career.
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can be viewed as a lower bound. Similarly, we might imagine that risky careers
lead individuals to become more risk tolerant; again, this biases estimates of the
importance of idiosyncratic factors downward.
The model shows how to identify the joint importance of idiosyncratic taste and
skill from the joint distribution of income risk and risk aversion. We can separate
taste from skill using data on income levels. When a risk-averse person chooses a
career with substantial income risk, on average he must be compensated in some
way for this risk. Such compensation could be in the form of higher idiosyncratic
skill in this career (and therefore higher pay) or higher idiosyncratic taste for this
career (and therefore higher enjoyment). To the degree that idiosyncratic skill
dominates idiosyncratic taste, we should see risk-averse people with high income
risk earning more than risk-averse people with low income risk. By comparing
this high-income risk versus low-income risk pay gap for those with high and low
risk-aversion, we can difference out market-wide compensating differentials for
income risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model;
Section 3 discusses the data used in estimating the model; Section 4 presents the
estimation strategy; Section 5 offers estimation results; and Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 Model
We present a model in which individuals choose from a set of career options. Each
career option has a quantity of income risk, a typical pay for that career, and other
non-pecuniary attributes. Each individual has a preference for income risk, an
overall ability (which affects pay in all careers equally), and other attributes. There
is a distribution of career options and a distribution of people in the population.
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In addition to these innate traits of careers and individuals, there are traits specific
to an individual in a given career. Some individuals have an idiosyncratic taste for
some careers over others, and some individuals are idiosyncratically better (have
higher productivity, and therefore higher pay) in some careers than others. From
the set of career options, each individual makes a one-time, irrevocable choice of
the best career. Then, the career-specific income shock is realized.
2.1 Setup
2.1.1 Careers
Career options are indexed by c ∈ {1, ..., NC}. Careers have four attributes, XC ≡
{σ2, yC , xCO, xCU}; XCc ≡ {σ2c , yCc , xCOc , xCUc } is the set of attributes for career c. σ2c
is a measure of the income risk in career c.8 yCc is a career-specific measure of log
pay in career c. xCc ≡
[
xCOc ;x
CU
c
]
is a vector of covariates or attributes of career c;
xCOc are the attributes observable to the econometrician and to workers; xCUc are the
set of attributes observable to workers but not to the econometrician. The industry
in which a career resides or the average hours worked by employees are examples
of typically observed career attributes (contained in xCOc ), while the noisiness of a
career is a typically unobserved career attribute (contained in xCUc ). We discuss the
identifying restrictions on xCU on page 17.
Later, we will consider a continuum of atomistic careers, so that NC → ∞.
In this case, fC(XC) is the distribution of career attributes, taken over the set of
possible careers. Naturally, in equilibrium some careers may be chosen more than
others, so that the distribution of career options will typically not be the distribution
of chosen careers.
8The assumption that income risk is associated with a career, not an individual, is a strong one.
Jacobs, Hartog, and Vijverberg (2009) discusses the biases associated with making this assumption
in reduced-form risk-return estimation.
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2.1.2 People
People are indexed by i ∈ {1, ..., NI}. People have four attributes,XI ≡ {γ, yI , xIO;xIU};
XIi ≡ {γi, yIi , xIOi ;xIUi } is the set of attributes for person i and f I(XI) is the distri-
bution of attributes in the population. γi is a measure of risk-aversion for person i.
yIi is a person-specific measure of log pay (general ability or productivity) for per-
son i. xIi ≡
[
xIOi ;x
IU
i
]
is a vector of attributes of person i; xIOi is the set of attributes
observable both to the econometrician and to workers in the model; xIUi is the set
of attributes observable to workers in the model but not to the econometrician.
Math skill is an example of a typically unobserved individual attribute (contained
in xIUi ), whereas age, gender, race and education are typically observed attributes
(contained in xIOi ). We discuss the identifying restrictions on xIU on page 17.
2.1.3 Individual-Career-Specific Fit
We assume that some careers are a better fit for some people than others. Fit is
characterized by two attributes, Xε ≡ {yε, lε}. Xεi,c ≡ {yεi,c, lεi,c} is the fit for person
i in career c. yεi,c is an individual-career-specific measure of log pay (idiosyncratic
productivity) of person i in career c. lεi,c is an individual-career-specific measure of
idiosyncratic enjoyment of person i in career c.
f εi,c(X
ε) is the joint distribution ofXεi,c ≡ {yεi,c, lεi,c}. We require thatXεi,c andXεi,c′
be identically distributed and independent of one another when c 6= c′, and also
that Xεi,c be independent of XIi and XCc . Independence when c 6= c′ is the standard
“independence of irrelevant alternatives” assumption present in multinomial logit
settings. Independence across i is also required for inference when we estimate
the model on data.
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2.1.4 Preferences
The model that follows assumes risk-averse, expected utility maximizing individ-
uals who care about stochastic income Y and career enjoyment L (for leisure). In-
dividuals have Cobb-Douglas preferences over Y and L, and expected utility pref-
erences over the composite, v. Individual i in career c has an expected utility of:
Eu(i, c) = E
[
v1−γii,c
1− γi
]
; (1)
vi,c ≡ Y 1−αi,c Lαi,c; (2)
lnYi,c ≡ yCc + yIi + yx(xIi , xCc ) + yεi,c + σcξ −
1
2
σ2c ; (3)
lnLi,c ≡ lx(xIi , xCc ) + lεi,c. (4)
Composite felicity vi,c is a Cobb-Douglas function of income Yi,c and career enjoy-
ment Li,c. The relative importance of income and career enjoyment is determined
by α. We impose an elasticity of substitution of one and do not allow for hetero-
geneity in α.
For simplicity, we assume a one-period model in which income Y is merely
equal to consumption.9 Log income in equation (3) is the sum of: career-specific
pay (yC), including a premium for size, risk, or non-pecuniary attributes; individual-
specific pay or ability (yI); the effect of the interaction of individual- and career-
specific covariates on pay (yx(xIi , xCc )); individual-career-specific pay (yεi,c), the in-
dividual’s career-specific productivity; and, the realization of a stochastic income
shock (σcξ − 12σ
2
c ). The random variable ξ is modeled as a standard normal vari-
able, so that σcξ − 12σ
2
c has an exponentiated expectation equal to one. Log enjoy-
9It is straightforward extend this to a multi-period setting in which a one-time career decision
affects income dynamics, and consumption and saving respond optimally to income shocks. This
richer structure loses the clean analytic framework presented below, but it is easy to implement
numerically. We omit it here for parsimony.
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ment in equation (4) is the sum of: the effect of the interaction of individual- and
career-specific covariates on enjoyment (lx(xIi , xCc )); and, individual-career-specific
enjoyment (lε). Covariates affect the pay and enjoyment of individual i in career c
as follows:
yx(xIi , x
C
c ) ≡ ι′
(
θy ·
(
xIix
C′
c
))
ι; lx(xIi , x
C
c ) ≡ ι′
(
θl ·
(
xIix
C′
c
))
ι.10 (5)
The model explicitly assumes that individuals never switch careers. This is
surely a restrictive assumption. However, this restriction allows us to present a
parsimonious model, identified from the joint distribution of risk aversion and
income risk.
2.1.5 Career Value
Plugging equations (2), (3), and (4) into equation (1), evaluating the expectation,
and transforming yields a log income certainty equivalent measure of the value of
career c to person i:
V (i, c) ≡ ln ((1− γi)Eu)
(1− α) (1− γi)
= yIi + y
C
c + y
x(xIi , x
C
c ) + y
ε
i,c
+
α
1− α
(
lεi,c + l
x(xIi , x
C
c )
)
− 1
2
(α + γi − αγi)σ2c . (6)
10The effect of covariates on pay and enjoyment depends on coefficient matrices, θy and θl:
θy =
[
θyOO θ
y
OU
θyUO θ
y
UU
]
; θl =
[
θlOO θ
l
OU
θlUO θ
l
UU
]
.
θy and θl are matrices of size NIO +NIU by NCO +NCU , where NCO and NCU are the number of
observable and unobservable career attributes, respectively, and NIO and NIU are the number of
observable and unobservable individual attributes, respectively. To explain the notation here, θyOU
is a NIO by NCU matrix that gives the impact on pay of the interaction of observable individual
attributes with unobservable career attributes. Note that “·” indicates pair-wise multiplication, and
ι is a vector of ones so that we merely sum up all elements of the matrix of effects, θy ·
(
xIi x
C′
c
)
or
θl ·
(
xIi x
C′
c
)
.
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Individuals will choose the career with the highest V . Note that person-
specific ability (yI) has no impact on the career chosen; it merely shifts the value of
all careers equally. There is no way to separate large α from large lεi,c in equation
(6), which informs the following transformations,
˜lx(xIi , xCc ) ≡
α
1− α
lx(xIi , x
C
c ); l̃
ε
i,c ≡
α
1− α
lεi,c. (7)
We also make a transformation to risk aversion,
γ̃i ≡ α + γi − αγi (8)
to match the object estimated in the PSID (as discussed on page 22).
We can then re-write the value of each career as:
V (i, c) = yIi + y
C
c + y
x(xIi , x
C
c ) +
˜lx(xIi , xCc )−
1
2
γ̃iσ
2
c + y
ε
i,c + l̃
ε
i,c. (9)
If we group pecuniary and non-pecuniary idiosyncratic terms and also group pe-
cuniary and non-pecuniary covariate terms as
εi,c ≡ yεi,c + l̃εi,c and v
(
xIi , x
C
c
)
≡ yx(xIi , xCc ) + ˜lx(xIi , xCc ), (10)
we arrive at our final expression for the log dollar-value certainty equivalent of a
career;
V (i, c) = yIi + y
C
c + v
(
xIi , x
C
c
)
− 1
2
γ̃iσ
2
c + εi,c. (11)
Equation (11) gives career choice a standard, random utility, multinomial logit
structure (McFadden, 1974). Individuals choose the career that gives them the
highest utility, which depends on career attributes that affect everyone equally
12
(yC), career attributes that affect different individuals differently (observable and
unobservable covariates v
(
xIi , x
C
c
)
and the utility cost of income risk σ2c which de-
pends on risk aversion γ̃i), and an error term (εi,c ≡ yεi,c+l̃εi,c). What is unique here is
that our economic model provides a cardinalization, so that when a career’s value
is expressed in terms of log-certainty equivalent income, the coefficient on σ2c × γ̃i
is (−1
2
). This cardinalization means that coefficient estimates and the standard de-
viation of the error term now have an absolute, log-income-equivalent meaning.
2.2 Stylized Model Without Idiosyncratic Career Preference
We begin by considering a model without idiosyncratic career taste, skill, or co-
variates, so that εi,c and v
(
xIi , x
C
c
)
are zero. All individuals with the same γ̃ are
indifferent among any options they choose with positive probability. This implies
a weakly (negatively) monotonic relationship between risk-aversion and income
risk choice. In this case, we should never see a more risk tolerant person choosing
less income risk. We consider a continuum of careers on some range of σ2c , which
have full support in the sense that all careers are chosen by someone. Let γ̃(σ2c ) be
the risk-aversion of the person who chooses income risk σ2c .11
At an interior optimum, the individual’s first order condition requires that12
dyC
dσ2c
=
1
2
γ̃. (12)
If equation (12) must hold for each {σ2c , γ̃(σ2c )} pair and we know the risk aversion
11Because of the full support assumption, each σ2c is chosen by someone and therefore maps to a
γ̃, though a measure zero set of σ2c values may map to multiple γ̃ values. The fact that the number
of such points is of measure zero means that the values we use here do not affect the risk-return
menu.
12Obtained by differentiating expected utility in equation (11) with respect to σ2c , setting equal to
zero, and rearranging terms.
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of the marginal individual for each σ2c , then we can trace out yC as
yCc = y
C
0 +
1
2
∫ σ2c
0
γ̃(x)dx. (13)
Here, yC0 is the log pay for a risk-free career. Note the strong assumptions needed
here, namely that all individuals face the same risk-return menu (up to an ability
intercept which can differ across individuals). A graphical depiction of this menu
is given in Figure 1.
2.3 Incorporating Idiosyncratic Career Preference
The stylized model in Section 2.2 has a homogeneous risk-return menu. Conse-
quently, we should never observe an individual with higher risk aversion choosing
higher income risk. This is wildly at odds with the data, which shows substantial
heterogeneity in the volatility associated with individuals with the same survey-
based estimate of risk aversion. We model this heterogeneity in equation (11),
where v
(
xIi , x
C
c
)
is the effect of the interaction of individual- and career-specific
covariates on pay and enjoyment (for person i in career c), and Xεi,c ≡ {yεi,c, l̃εi,c} are
idiosyncratic individual-career-specific productivity and taste shocks, respectively.
The logit structure we introduce becomes tractable when we work with ex-
treme value errors. Such errors can be obtained under either of two assumptions.
Under the first, we require that the underlying idiosyncratic terms (εi,c) have an
extreme value distribution (of Type I, Gumbel). Under the second, we assume
that the number of careers NC be large in the sense that we can use extreme value
theory to describe the best career. In this case, we require that the cdf of εi,c be
twice differentiable (de Haan and Ferreira, 2006). The normal and exponential
distributions are examples of such distributions. Coupled with the independence
assumptions from Section 2.1.3, this implies that the maximum of εi,c has an ex-
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treme value distribution (of Type I, Gumbel). In either case, our aim is to estimate
the scale parameter β that governs the distribution either of an extreme-valued
εi,c or the extreme-valued maxima. When εi,c has an extreme value distribution
var(εi,c) = β
2π2/6; when its maximum does, var(εi,c) ∝ β2π2/6.13
Let r refer to the set of careers for person i in a rectangle on the
{
yC + v
(
xIi , x
C
)
, σ2
}
plane; let sr be the share of careers that fall in region r. We assume that the num-
ber of careers in each region r is large enough that maxc∈rεi,c has an extreme value
distribution (with scale parameter β), or that each εi,c has an extreme value distri-
bution (with scale parameter β) to begin with. Consider the choice among careers
c in range r. Taking the size of the rectangle to zero, within-range differences be-
tween careers c in XC , will be trivially small. As a result, if the individual chooses
a career from within range r, it will be the one with the highest εi,c.
Given the extreme value distribution, the expected value of the chosen career
is
V (XIi ) ≡ E[V (i, r) | V (i, r) > V (i, q),∀q 6= r]
= µ+ βγem + y
I
i + β ln(
∑
q
sqe
(yCq +v(xIi ,xCq )− 12 γ̃iσ2q )/β). 14 (14)
Note the expected value of a chosen career does not depend on XC , so that learn-
ing the attributes of a chosen career provides no information about expected well-
13There are two technical advantages to an extreme value approach. First, increasing the number
of careers affects only the location parameter µ, shifting the whole distribution up while leaving its
shape (governed by parameter β) unchanged. As a result, we can normalize out µ, so that we need
not take a position on the total number of careers NC (an idea without precise meaning) to identify
the model. Second, results are not dependent on a particular parametric shape for the distribution
of individual-career-specific shocks, εi,c.
14Here µ and β are the location and scale parameters of the extreme value distribution, and
γem ≈ 0.577 refers to the Euler-Mascheroni constant. Summation takes place over all rectangles q
on the
{
yC + v
(
xIi , x
C
)
, σ2
}
plane.
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being. The probability that an individual’s preferred career will lie in range r is
prob(V (i, r) ≥ V (i, q), ∀q 6= r) ∝ sre(y
C
r +v(xIi ,xCr )− 12 γ̃iσ2r)/β. (15)
The full derivations of equations (14) and (15) are provided in Section A.1 of the
Appendix. We re-write equation (15) by taking the size of each range to zero, so
that the sums become integrals and sr becomes fC(XC):
f(XC | XI) ∝ f(XC | γ̃ = 0, XI)e−
1
2
γ̃σ2/β; (16)
f(XC | γ̃ = 0, XI) ∝ fC(XC)e(yC+v(xI ,xC))/β. (17)
The model implies that a risk-neutral person (equation (17)) will choose ca-
reers proportional to their frequency fC(XC). Ceteris paribus, a risk-neutral person
will be twice as likely to choose a career with a given set of attributes if twice
as many careers have those attributes. A risk-neutral person is also more likely
to choose careers with higher career-specific pay and enjoyment (yC + v
(
xI , xC
)
).
These career-specific attributes dominate career frequency when idiosyncratic ca-
reer taste and skill are relatively unimportant (β → 0). Without idiosyncratic
career fit, risk-neutral people will merely choose the career with the highest yC +
v
(
xI , xC
)
; the distribution of risk choices will be extremely tight around the “best”
choice. However, as the importance of idiosyncratic career fit increases (β → ∞),
careers are chosen only in proportion to their frequency; the distribution of choices
becomes as diffuse as the distribution of careers fC . We should be unsurprised to
see that individual-specific ability (yI) does not affect career choice as it increases
the benefit of all careers equally.
Of course, we don’t observe all elements ofXC orXI . As with any logit model,
our estimates may be biased unless we make the assumptions needed to integrate
out individual- and career-specific unobservables. We begin by integrating out
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unobservable components of careers.15 To do so, we require that γ̃ does not affect
the expected payoff of some risk levels more than others, so that
E
[
e(y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β | XI , σ2, xCO
]
(18)
does not vary with γ̃. If we take the example from page 8 of noisiness as an unob-
servable career attribute, workers’ distaste for noisiness across careers with differ-
ent income risk levels must be unaffected by their risk aversion.
Then, we integrate out individual-specific unobservables. To do so, we must
make the assumption that the expected value of careers at various income risk
levels cannot be differentially affected by individual unobservables for different
levels of risk aversion. In other words,
E
[
e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)|σ2, xCO, xIO
]
(19)
should not vary with γ̃. In the example from page 9 of math aptitude as an unob-
servable individual attribute, the benefits of math aptitude by career income risk
cannot depend on risk-aversion. Section A.2 of the Appendix presents these as-
sumptions formally, and shows how we use them to integrate out individual- and
career-specific unobservables.
In this case, equations (16) and (17) become:
f(σ2 | γ̃, xIO, xCO) ∝ f(σ2 | γ̃ = 0, xIO, xCO)e−
1
2
γ̃σ2/β; (20)
f(σ2 | γ̃ = 0, xIO, xCO) ∝ fC(σ2|xCO)f
C(xCO)
f (xCO)
E
[
e(y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β | σ2, xIO, xCO, γ̃ = 0
]
.
(21)
15We do not observe career-specific pay (yC) (only total pay which includes individual-specific
ability, yI , and an idiosyncratic productivity shock to the chosen career, yεi,c) or unobservable career-
specific attributes (XCU ). We integrate these out to obtain the marginal distribution of observable
career choices.
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The critical insight from equations (16) or (20) is that the distribution of risk
choices for risk-averse people f(σ2|γ̃) is completely determined by the distribu-
tion for risk-neutral people f(σ2|γ̃ = 0) and a single parameter β. Each condi-
tional distribution f(σ2|γ̃) for a given γ̃ is merely an exponential shift of another
such conditional distribution for another γ̃. The degree of that shift is governed by
β, which is proportional to the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic individual-
specific-career taste and skill shocks. For large shocks (high β), the shift is modest
and conditional distributions look more similar to one another (and more similar
to the distribution of careers, fC). For small shocks (low β), the shift is more sub-
stantial and conditional distributions for high and low γ̃ become more different
(and each becomes more concentrated around the “best” choice for that γ̃). When
idiosyncratic shocks are large, the distribution of risk choices by risk-neutral peo-
ple will reflect primarily the distribution of career options (fC(σ2 | xCO)); when
idiosyncratic shocks are small, the distribution of risk choices by risk-neutral peo-
ple will reflect primarily which risk values have careers with the highest expected
(pecuniary and non-pecuniary) value.
Note that this model is highly over-identified when we observe the joint dis-
tribution of σ2 and γ̃. The model is agnostic about the risk distribution chosen by
risk neutral people (f(σ2 | γ̃ = 0)). However, f(σ2 | γ̃ = 0) and a single parameter
(β) completely determine the risk distribution f(σ2 | γ̃) for all γ̃.
2.4 Idiosyncratic Career Taste vs. Idiosyncratic Career Skill
Equation (20) provides a way to estimate β from the degree to which the condi-
tional distribution of risk choices shifts with risk-aversion (recall that β measures
the standard deviation of yεi,c + l̃εi,c). Without additional information, we cannot
separate the relative importance of individual-specific shocks to skill in specific
careers (yεi,c) from individual-specific shocks to taste for (enjoyment of) those ca-
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reers l̃εi,c.
However, we can separate these two effects using income data. Observed log
pay (ignoring the mean-zero income shock ξ) is:
log payi,c ≡ y
I
i + y
C
c + y
x(xIi , x
C
c ) + y
ε
i,c. (22)
Combining equations (11) and (22) yields:
log payi,c = Vi,c − ˜lx(xIi , xCc ) +
1
2
γ̃iσ
2
c − l̃εi,c. (23)
We can then take the expectation of log pay conditional on career c having the
highest Vi,c from equation (14):
E[log payi,c | Vi,c ≥ Vi,c′ ∀c
′] = V (XI)− ˜lx(xIi , xCc ) +
1
2
γ̃iσ
2
c − E[l̃εi,c | Vi,c > Vi,c′ ∀c′]
= µ+ βγem + y
I
i + β ln(
∑
q
sqe
(yCq +v(xIi ,xCq )− 12 γ̃iσ2q )/β)
− ˜lx(xIi , xCc ) +
1
2
γ̃iσ
2
c − E[l̃εi,c | Vi,c > Vi,c′ ∀c′]. (24)
Next, we take the expectation of Vi,c from equation (11) conditional on career c
having the highest Vi,c:
E[V (i, c) | Vi,c ≥ Vi,c′ ∀c′] = V (XI) = yIi + yCc + v
(
xIi , x
C
c
)
− 1
2
γ̃iσ
2
c
+ E[yεi,c + l̃
ε
i,c | Vi,c ≥ Vi,c′ ∀c′]. (25)
Plugging equation (14) into equation (25) and re-arranging terms yields:
E[yεi,c + l̃
ε
i,c | Vi,c ≥ Vi,c′ ∀c′] (26)
= µ+ βγem + β ln(
∑
q
sqe
(yCq +v(xIi ,xCq )− 12 γ̃iσ2q )/β)− yCc − v
(
xIi , x
C
c
)
+
1
2
γ̃iσ
2
c .
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By assuming joint normality of yεi,c and l̃εi,c , so that the signal extraction problem is
linear, E[yεi,c + l̃εi,c | Vi,c ≥ Vi,c′ ∀c′] from equation (26) identifies E[l̃εi,c | Vi,c > Vi,c′ ∀c′]
in equation (24):
E[l̃εi,c | Vi,c ≥ Vi,c′ ∀c′] =
var(l̃εi,c)
var(yεi,c + l̃
ε
i,c)
(µ+ βγem + β ln(
∑
q
sqe
(yCq +v(xIi ,xCq )− 12 γ̃iσ2q )/β)
− yCc − v
(
xIi , x
C
c
)
+
1
2
γ̃iσ
2
c ). (27)
Plugging equation (27) into equation (24) yields:
E[log payi,c | Vi,c ≥ Vi,c′ ∀c
′] = (µ+ βγem)(1−
var(l̃εi,c)
var(yεi,c + l̃
ε
i,c)
)
+ yIi + β ln(
∑
q
sqe
(yCq +v(xIi ,xCq )− 12 γ̃iσ2q )/β)(1−
var(l̃εi,c)
var(yεi,c + l̃
ε
i,c)
)
+ yCc
var(l̃εi,c)
var(yεi,c + l̃
ε
i,c)
− v
(
xIi , x
C
c
)
(1−
var(l̃εi,c)
var(yεi,c + l̃
ε
i,c)
)
+
1
2
γ̃iσ
2
c (1−
var(l̃εi,c)
var(yεi,c + l̃
ε
i,c)
). (28)
The first line in this log pay equation depends on neither individual attributes
(XI) nor chosen career attributes (XC). The second line depends on individual at-
tributes (XI , specifically yIi and γi) but not chosen career attributes. The third line
depends on chosen career attributes (specifically yCc and xCOc but not σ2c ) and indi-
vidual observables (xIOi ). The final line depends on both an individual attribute
(γi) and a career attribute (σ2).
Equation (28) suggests that a simple regression can be used to recover the rel-
ative importance of taste shocks (l̃εi,c) compared with all shocks (y
ε
i,c + l̃
ε
i,c). The
regression predicts pay with the following controls: a constant; individual-specific
controls (including risk aversion); career-attribute controls (particularly a measure
of income risk); and, the interaction of individual- and career-specific controls (be-
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sides risk aversion and income risk). As shown in the fourth line of equation (28),
it also includes the interaction between risk aversion (γ̃i) and income risk (σ2c ); the
coefficient on this interaction identifies 1
2
× (1− var(l̃εi,c)/var(yεi,c + l̃εi,c)).
If people dislike risk, they must be compensated in some way for taking more
of it. The more risk-averse a person is, the greater such compensation must be.
This compensation could come in the form of higher pay or more career enjoy-
ment. Risk-averse people will only choose risky jobs if they love them or are very
productive in them (thereby earning particularly high pay). In a world in which
most idiosyncratic variation is in enjoyment, we will see risk-averse people com-
pensated by choosing risky jobs they particularly enjoy. In a world in which most
idiosyncratic variation is in ability or productivity, we will see risk-averse people
compensated by choosing jobs at which they particularly excel and therefore earn
higher pay. We should not see this pattern among the risk-neutral.
3 Data
Our data are the core sample of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The
PSID was designed as a nationally representative panel of U.S. households (Hill,
1991); it provides annual or biennial labor income spanning the years 1968 to 2005.
Restricting ourselves to male household heads aged 22 through 6016 gives us 52,181
observations on 3,041 individuals with 17 years of recorded data per individual on
average. Furthermore, we restrict the sample to individuals with income (and
therefore volatility) values in 1991 through 1996, with risk tolerance responses
recorded in the 1996 wave, and non-zero population weights17. There are 1,406
16Age restrictions are standard in the income dynamics literature, though exact age ranges vary
slightly: Gottschalk and Moffitt (2002) (22-59), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) (25-55), and Abowd
and Card (1989) (21-64).
17Individuals who entered the sample through marriage are assigned a zero weight in the PSID.
We keep these individuals in the sample by assigning them their spouses’ weights.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
mean st. dev. min max
age (years) 42.9 7.9 26 60
education (years) 14.1 2.2 0 17
married 85.8% . . .
black 3.7% . . .
annual income (2005 $s) $58, 034 $53, 275 0 $753, 234
family size 3.2 1.3 1 9
This table summarizes data from the 1,406 male household heads in the sample in 1996.
individuals meeting this criteria. Summary statistics about the demographics of
this group in 1996 are shown in Table 1.
3.1 Risk-Aversion
In 1996, the PSID included a series of survey questions which aimed to elicit es-
timates of risk tolerance. Respondents were asked a series of questions about
hypothetical income gambles. The first such question was: ”[Y]ou are given the
opportunity to take a new, and equally good, job with a 50-50 chance that it will
double your income and spending power. But there is a 50-50 chance that it will
cut your income and spending power by a third. Would you take the new job?”
If the respondent answered ”yes”, she was asked the same question again though
she faced the risk that her income would be cut by one-half instead of one-third; if
she answered ”no” the question was again the same but she faced the risk that her
income would be cut by only one-fifth. For those people who answered yes to both
questions they were asked or no to both one additional question was asked with
an income cut of three-quarters or one-tenth respectively. Based on the responses
to these questions, individuals’ were placed into one of four risk tolerances bins.
In our model, estimated risk tolerance corresponds to the value 1/γ̃, not 1/γ.
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This is because the hypothetical gambles in the PSID seek to estimate the curva-
ture of the utility function with respect to income, which in our model is given by
γ̃ = α+γi−αγi. Further, the risk tolerance estimates in the PSID are especially well
suited for our model, since they hold all non-income considerations fixed, mean-
ing the effects of risky career income can be separated from the effects of career
enjoyment.
3.2 Income Volatility
Using data from the PSID, we calculate two “off-the-shelf” measures of income
volatility. Jensen and Shore develop a methodology to estimate non-parametrically
the distribution of volatility of excess log income - the residual from a regression
to predict the natural log of labor income. This regression is weighted by PSID-
provided sample weights, normalized so that the average weight in each year is the
same. We use the following as covariates in this regression: a cubic in age for each
level of educational attainment (none, elementary, junior high, some high school,
high school, some college, college, graduate school); the presence and number of
infants, young children, and older children in the household; the total number of
family members in the household, and dummy variables for each calendar year.
Including calendar year dummy variables eliminates the need to convert nominal
income to real income explicitly.
While some other papers have dropped observations with missing and zero
income (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 2002) or modeled unemployment explicitly (Pista-
ferri, 2002), neither route is available to us because the method in Jensen and Shore
is not designed to handle missing data or zeros. Instead, Jensen and Shore fill
in hot-deck imputed missing values when calculating volatility. Aside from us-
ing their volatility values, we do not explicitly use bootstrapped income data. We
follow Jensen and Shore in using top- and bottom-codes. The income dynamics
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used by Jensen and Shore to estimate income volatility are quite standard, charac-
terizing the evolution of excess log income for individual i over time t (Carroll and
Samwick, 1997; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004). Excess log income yi,t is modeled as
the sum of permanent income, transitory income, and error ei,t.
yi,t =
t−3∑
k=1
ωi,k +
t∑
k=t−2
φω,t−k · ωi,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Permanent income
+
t∑
k=t−2
φε,t−k · εi,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Transitory income
+ ei,t. (29)
Permanent income is the weighted sum of past permanent shocks ωi,k to income.
Transitory income is the weighted sum of recent transitory shocks εi,k to income.18
The permanent shock, transitory shock, and error term are assumed to be nor-
mally distributed as well as independent of one another over time and across in-
dividuals. The permanent shocks ωi,t have mean zero and variance σ2ω,i,t ≡ E[ω2i,t];
the transitory shocks εi,t have mean zero and variance σ2ε,i,t ≡ E[ε2i,t]:
 ωit
εi,t
 ∼ N

 0
0
 ,
 σ2ω,i,t 0
0 σ2ε,i,t

 . (30)
We refer to σ2i,t ≡ (σ2ε,i,t, σ2ω,i,t) jointly as the volatility parameters. Finally, we have
“noise variance”which refers to the variance of measurement error γ2 ≡ E[e2i,t] that
is constant across individuals and over time.
Jensen and Shore (2009a,b) develop a Markovian hierarchical Dirichlet Process
(MHDP) prior that they use to estimate the distribution of ex-ante expected volatil-
ity. We use the estimates of the ex-ante expected permanent volatility distribution
18In this framework model, permanent shocks come into effect over three periods and transi-
tory shocks fade completely after three periods, giving us three permanent weight parameters
(φω,0, φω,1, φω,2) and three transitory weight parameters (φε,0, φε,1, φε,2). We refer to these weights
φ collectively as the income process parameters, which will need to be estimated in our model.
Jensen and Shore posit flat prior distributions for each weight parameter (i.e. p(φ) ∝ 1). How-
ever, in order to give meaning to the magnitude of our transitory shocks, we normalize the weights
placed on transitory shocks to sum to one (
∑
k φε,k = 1).
24
from their paper, and take the average of these estimates over the years 1991-1996
as our final measure of income volatility.
The Jensen and Shore (2009a,b) method for estimating income volatility is one
of a few possible estimation methods. For example, we could use the moment
proposed by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004),
σ2ω,i,t = E[(yi,t − yi,t−1)× (yi,t+m − yi,t−1−n)], (31)
where we choose m = 2 and n = 2 respectively. We could also use the Jensen and
Shore (2009a,b) method with income volatility estimated separately by risk toler-
ance bin. What is important for sensible estimates of β is a minimal level of sorting
of the more risk tolerant individuals into the more risky careers. Table 2 shows the
extent of this sorting based on three different income volatility estimation meth-
ods: the original Jensen and Shore (2009a,b) method, the Meghir and Pistaferri
(2004) method, and the Jensen and Shore (2009a,b) method estimated separately
by risk tolerance bin.
It is clear from Table 2 that there is sorting of the more risk tolerant into riskier
careers, regardless of the income volatility estimation method. Because this sort-
ing is present regardless of method, we use only the Jensen and Shore (2009a,b)
estimates in Section 4. Table 3 presents the joint distribution of volatility and risk
aversion. In that table, σ2 values are divided into 10 bins. The distribution of
σ2 values is also shown in the left panel of Figure 2. The right panel shows the
proportion of the data in each of these 10 bins. Note that individuals with high
risk aversion were slightly less likely to have the highest volatility values.19
19This is also apparent in reduced-form regressions to predict volatility with risk-aversion and
other controls. These are shown in Table 4.
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Table 3: Estimated distribution of income volatility by self-reported risk-aversion
σ̂2 from Jensen and Shore
σ̂2 > σ̂2 ≤
unconditional σ̂2 distribution conditional on γ̃
σ̂2 distribution [0,2) [2, 3.84) [3.84, 7.52) [7.52,∞)
0.142 0.152 29.17 % 25.33 % 33.01 % 32.57 % 28.22 %
0.152 0.162 53.14 % 48.84 % 51.14 % 49.73 % 57.24 %
0.162 0.172 5.92 % 7.42 % 5.20 % 4.63 % 6.00 %
0.172 0.182 2.21 % 2.86 % 0.93 % 2.98 % 2.05 %
0.182 0.202 2.05 % 3.57 % 1.87 % 1.86 % 1.47 %
0.202 0.402 3.37 % 4.95 % 5.56 % 3.52 % 1.80 %
0.402 0.602 1.08 % 1.99 % 0.00 % 1.28 % 0.95 %
0.602 0.802 1.78 % 2.22 % 1.71 % 1.90 % 1.55 %
0.802 0.992 0.50 % 1.10 % 0.00 % 0.69 % 0.33 %
12 12 0.79 % 1.73 % 0.60 % 0.83 % 0.39 %
Mean σ̂2 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04
St. Dev. σ̂2 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.12 0.10
# of Obs. 1,406 299 225 254 628
% of Obs. 100 % 21.27 % 15.99 % 18.07 % 44.67 %
This table shows the distribution of σ2 estimates. σ2 estimates are the average of 1991 to 1996
estimates of permanent volatility. Volatility estimates are from Jensen and Shore and are top-coded
at 1. γ̃ ranges are from the coarsely-binned responses to the 1996 risk-tolerance supplement to the
PSID.
Table 5 shows (1991-1996) income volatility and (1996) risk-aversion data by
(1991) “one-digit” occupational category. Note that, while income volatility varies
across occupations, the correlation between occupational income volatility and oc-
cupational risk tolerance is quite low.
4 Estimation
If we could observe the joint distribution of data
{
σ2, γ̃, xIO, xCO
}
, then estimation
of equations (20) and (21) by maximum likelihood is straightforward. We need
only choose a parametric (or nonparametric) structure for f(σ2 | γ̃ = 0, xIO, xCO),
and estimate its parameters along with β by maximum likelihood. Table 3 shows
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Table 4: Relationship between Income Volatility (’91-’96) and Risk Aversion (’96)
Jensen-Shore
Dep. Var. Income Risk Level Income Risk Log
E[γ̃ | bin] -0.005 -0.005 -0.015 -0.031 -0.034 -0.102
(0.002)† (0.002)† (0.008) (0.009)† (0.009)† (0.044)*
age
0.001 0.001 0.006 0.008
(0.000)* (0.001)* (0.002)† (0.003)†
controls no no yes no no yes
R2 0.005 0.010 0.049 0.009 0.014 0.051
# of Obs. 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406
Table 4 shows the OLS regressions to predict individual-specific measures of income risk with self-
reported risk-aversion bin. E[γ̃ | bin] refers to the expected value of risk aversion conditional on
risk aversion bin, which we estimate using the signal-noise structure identified in Kimball, Sahm,
and Shapiro. The variable age refers to the individual’s age in years, and controls include occupa-
tion, family, and demographic characteristics. ∗ Indicates significance at the 5% level, † indicates
significance at the 1% level.
the non-parametric approach we pursue, splitting σ2 into 10 ranges. We assign
each range the σ2 value of its mid-point. Covariates aside, we need only estimate
β and nine probabilities: the probability that a risk-neutral person will land in each
of the 10 volatility bins.
The complication is that we do not observe γ̃ exactly; we see only into which
of four coarse bins γ̃ falls. Furthermore, there is measurement error in γ̃, so that
the true value for γ̃ may not even fall in the range of its bin. We adopt the classical
measurement error structure proposed in Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2009) to
model the distribution of γ̃ in the PSID given that we observe it with error, and
even then, only in bins. In particular, Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro estimate the
following structure for γ̃:
̂ln(1/γ̃) = ln(1/γ̃) + e (32) ln(γ̃)
e
 ∼ N

 −1.05
0
 ,
 0.76 0
0 1.69

 (33)
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Figure 2: Jensen-Shore Permanent Income Volatility Bins
Distribution of σ Distribution of σ
(equally spaced bins) (10 bins)
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The left panel presents the distribution of 1991 − 1996 σ estimates from Jensen and Shore, a his-
togram of the standard deviation of permanent income changes. The right panel shows the dis-
tribution of income volatility by the 10 coarse bins used in the non-parametric estimation of β and
f(σ|γ̃ = 0).
Table 5: Distribution of income risk and risk-aversion by broad occupational cate-
gory
Jensen-
Shore σ2 γ bin
occupation obs mean st.dev least← risk averse→most
prof./tech. 328 0.031 0.063 20 % 20 % 19 % 40 %
managers 318 0.063 0.169 27 % 14 % 15 % 44 %
clerical 207 0.032 0.074 20 % 15 % 15 % 49 %
craftsmen 263 0.048 0.121 16 % 14 % 23 % 46 %
operators 147 0.039 0.078 18 % 12 % 19 % 50 %
laborers 47 0.033 0.057 15 % 19 % 17 % 49 %
farmers 34 0.141 0.260 18 % 18 % 9 % 56 %
n/a 62 0.059 0.113 32 % 21 % 19 % 27 %
overall 1,406 0.047 0.119 22 % 16 % 18 % 44 %
Table 5 shows the distribution of self-reported risk preference by one-digit occupational categories.
The n/a category includes non-responses.
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We observe true log risk tolerance (ln(1/γ̃)) plus noise (e), placed into bins, so that
a given observation lies in a given bin if ̂ln(1/γ̃) > bin and ̂ln(1/γ̃) < bin, where
bin and bin are the lower and upper bounds of the bins, respectively. Again, Table
3 shows these ranges and the fraction of observed data that falls into each.20
We can then identify the relationship between our data (f(σ2 | ̂1/ ln(γ̃) bin))
and the object we wish to estimate (f(σ2 | γ̃) from equation (21)):
f
(
σ2 | ̂1/ ln(γ̃) bin
)
=
∫
γ̃
f
(
σ2 | γ̃
)
fln(1/γ̃)
(
ln (1/γ̃) | ̂1/ ln(γ̃) bin
)
dγ̃ (34)
fln(1/γ̃)
(
ln (1/γ̃) | ̂1/ ln(γ̃) bin
)
= fln(1/γ̃)
(
ln
(
1/1̃/γ
)) pr( ̂1/ ln(γ̃) bin | γ̃)
pr
(
̂1/ ln(γ̃) bin
) (35)
Given the distribution of true variation and classical measurement error estimated
by Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro, it is trivial to calculate fln(1/γ̃)
(
ln (1/γ̃) | ̂1/ ln(γ̃) bin
)
and pr
(
̂1/ ln(γ̃) bin | γ̃
)
for each γ̃ in our grid for each of the four risk-aversion
bins; pr
(
̂1/ ln(γ̃) bin
)
is similarly easy to calculate for each of the four risk-aversion
bins.
Armed with this distribution of γ̃, we search for maximum likelihood estimates
of f(σ2 | γ̃ = 0) and β iteratively. First, we guess values of f(σ2 | γ̃ = 0) and β.
Next, we calculate f(σ2 | γ̃) for each value of σ2 and γ̃ on our grid. Next, we
calculate f(σ2 | γ̃) for each of the 10 grid values of σ2 and each of the four coarse
bins for γ̃ by integrating over each value of γ̃ possible in each bin. This gives
the likelihood of an observation lying in one of the 10 × 4 = 40 possible ranges
we observe in Table 3. We then compute the likelihood of observing the data in
Table 3. We search over f(σ2 | γ̃ = 0) and β to find values which maximize the
likelihood.
20We approximate this distribution with a 38 element grid, assigning a probability that γ̃ will be
each of the following values: {0.5, 1.25, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.4, 3.8, 4.5, 5.5, ..., 9.5, 10, 10.5, 11, 12, ..., 34}.
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5 Results
Equations (20) and (21) show the key model parameters we estimate in Section 5.1:
f(σ2 | γ̃ = 0, xIO, xCO) and β. f(σ2 | γ̃ = 0, xIO, xCO) is the distribution of income
risk chosen by risk-neutral people, which shifts with covariates (θ); β (proportional
to var(εi,c)) measures the importance of idiosyncratic taste and skill from the shift
in the distribution of income risk as risk aversion increases. In Section 5.2, we
present the risk-return menu implied by the β we estimate in Section 5.1 under
different assumptions about the elasticity of demand for careers. In Section 5.3, we
present results from the regressions implied by equation (28), designed to separate
the relative importance of idiosyncratic taste from idiosyncratic skill. In Section
5.4, we reinterpret our results in the context of search frictions.
5.1 Parameter Estimates
Figure 3 shows the distribution of f(σ2 | γ̃ = 0, xIO, xCO) = f(σ2 | γ̃ = 0) when
the model is estimated without additional covariates. We obtain a 95% confidence
interval around these estimates by finding the highest and lowest values of f(σ2 |
γ̃ = 0, xIO, xCO) (separately for each σ2 bin) such that the restricted model fails to
reject the likelihood ratio test that these restricted f(σ2 | γ̃ = 0, xIO, xCO) values are
correct. The numerical values associated with Figure 3 are shown in Table 5.
Table 6 shows the coefficient estimates from equations (20) and (21). The β
point estimate using Jensen and Shore volatility without other controls is 0.70, so
that the standard deviation of idiosyncratic career values is 70%× π/
√
6 of income
(in log points). We find upper and lower bounds on beta as β < 2.25 and β > 0.35
respectively. Although these estimates are large, we view the lower-bound on β
as entirely plausible; it implies a dispersion of idiosyncratic taste or skill of 44% of
income. Said differently, a one standard deviation decrease in career ”enjoyment”
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Figure 3: Over/Under Representation of Risk-Neutral Individuals by σ2 Bins
(Lowest σ2 Bins←→ Highest σ2 Bins)
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σ2 Bins
This figure presents estimates of f(σ|γ̃ = 0). These are normalized by dividing by the value in the
right panel of Figure 2 and subtracting one. This shows the degree to which risk-neutral individuals
are estimated to over-weight or under-weight this bin relative the population as a whole. This
panel shows 95% confidence intervals from a likelihood ratio test (where only this probability but
no other parameters are restricted).
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is equivalent to a pay decrease of 44%. Adding controls for age, race, education
and occupation changes the point estimate and upper/lower bounds of β only
slightly21. Note that if risk-averse individuals make their own income streams
less risky, estimates of β will be biased downward; we would observe a stronger
correlation between risk aversion and income risk in the data. This implies that
our estimate of the lower bound on β is smaller than the true lower bound. Along
with estimates of β, Table 6 shows the estimates of f(σ2 | γ̃ = 0, xIO, xCO) and θ.
5.2 The Risk-Return Menu
Further, equation (21) shows that the distribution of σ2 choices by risk-neutral peo-
ple may reflect the distribution of career options fC or the relative value of those
options (E
[
e(y
C+v(xI ,xC))
1
β | σ2
]
). There is no way to differentiate these two cases
without a model of wage adjustment. At one extreme, we can assume that the
demand for workers in each career option is completely inelastic, so that wages
adjust until the unconditional distribution of chosen careers f(σ2) is equal to the
distribution of career options (fC). In this case, we implicitly observe fC , and can
identify (yC+v
(
xI , xC
)
), the income premium needed to fill all careers at each level
of volatility. Assuming no heterogeneity conditional on σ2, from equation (21) we
have ey
C+v(xI ,xC) = (f(σ
2|γ̃=0)
fC
)β . Given our estimates of f(σ2 | γ̃ = 0), we can trace
out the implied risk-return menu, the income premium needed to fill all careers at
each volatility bin. Estimates of this risk-return menu are shown in Figure 4. Note
the substantial risk premium required to fill the high income risk bins. This is con-
sistent with the idea that important idiosyncratic taste or skill in various careers
implies that the marginal person choosing a risky career is not very risk tolerant,
21Results using the Meghir Pistaferri method of income volatility are broadly similar. Unsur-
prisingly, β estimates generated by the Meghir-Pistaferri moments are higher. This is consistent
with the attenuation bias in estimates of 1/β we would expect given the more dispersed Meghir-
Pistaferri volatility estimates, which measure realized rather than expected volatility.
33
Table 6: Parameter Estimates
Jensen-Shore σ
β̂ 0.701 0.653 0.671
β < 2.253 2.011 2.166
β > 0.346 0.330 0.332
lowest 25.2 % 29.7 % 30.8 %
income 47.6 % 54.4 % 55.4 %
risk 5.5 % 6.1 % 6.1 %
↑ 2.1 % 2.3 % 2.3 %
f(σ2|γ = 0) 2.0 % 2.1 % 2.0 %4.6 % 3.3 % 2.6 %
↓ 2.3 % 0.8 % 0.4 %
highest 5.3 % 0.9 % 0.3 %
income 2.0 % 0.1 % 0.0 %
risk 3.5 % 0.2 % 0.0 %
age×σ2 . 0.07 0.07
edu.×σ2 . 0.04 0.26
race×σ2 no yes yes
occ.×σ2 no no yes
Table 6 displays the estimates of β (including a 95% confidence interval), f(σ2|γ̃ = 0), and θ from
equations (20) and (21). The point estimates of β correspond to the variance of idiosyncratic taste
and skill shocks. f(σ2|γ̃ = 0) is the probability that a risk-neutral individual populates each of the
10 σ2 bins. The vector θ represents the coefficient estimates of these controls.
and must be offered a significant risk compensation (either in pay or enjoyment)
to fill this risky career.
At the other extreme, we can assume that demand for workers in each career
is completely elastic, so that the value of each career is the same in expectation.
In this case, careers are filled in proportion to their frequency, so that careers with
twice as many slots are twice as likely to be chosen by the risk-neutral individual.
In this case, the risk-return menu is simply a horizontal line. The distribution of
risk-neutral choices in this scenario are shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 4: Average Risk Premia by Income Risk Bin
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Figure 4 shows the estimated income premium yC at the midpoint of each σ2 bin. The two panels
display the full range of σ values on different vertical axis scales. The dashed curve reflects the
perfect-sorting case from equation (13). The solid-curve reflects the required risk-premium needed
to rationalize the data, under the assumption that career supply is inelastic so that pay adjusts so
that the income risk distribution of career options equals the income risk distribution of chosen
careers, when equation (20) is estimated without covariates.
5.3 Idiosyncratic Taste or Skill?
Next, we use income data to decompose εi,c into idiosyncratic career skill (yεi,c) and
taste (l̃εi,c). Estimation by OLS of equation (28) identifies (1−var(l̃εi,c)/var(yεi,c+ l̃εi,c)),
the coefficient on 1
2
× γ̃i × σ2c . If this coefficient is 0, the variation in career choice
is exclusively in idiosyncratic taste; if this coefficient is 1 it is exclusively in skill;
intermediate values indicate the presence of both idiosyncratic taste and skill. The
intuition here is that risk-averse people demand a larger “compensation” to enter
high-risk careers. As a result, the gap in “compensation” between high- and low-
risk careers will be greatest for those with the highest risk-aversion. If we do not
observe a pay gap, this compensation must be in the form of idiosyncratic taste
(loving your job). Table 7 shows the results from regressing pay on γ̃i, σ2c , their
interaction, and covariates.22 When non-linear functions of σ2c are included as
22Note that γ̃i refers to E[γ̃i | ̂̃γ bin], which is based on the distribution of γ̃i and measurement
error proposed by Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2009).
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controls, the coefficient estimate on 1
2
×γ̃i×σ2c exceeds 12 , with standard errors small
enough that we may rule out a coefficient of zero. Results with this specification
indicate that idiosyncratic skill and the increased compensation that follows has at
least some role in driving career choice. Finally, note the similarity between this
regression and the risk-augmented Mincer equations from Hartog (2009), which
provides a consistency check on our particular sample.
5.4 Reinterpreting Our Results in the Context of Search
Recall that in Section 2.2 we presented an illustration without idiosyncratic taste
and skill which implied perfect sorting of the most risk-averse people into the
safest careers. In Section 2.3 we interpreted deviations from this perfect sorting as
an indication of the presence of idiosyncratic taste for or skill in various careers. An
alternative interpretation is that deviations from perfect sorting reflect the presence
of search frictions (see Lucas and Prescott (1974), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994),
Pissarides (2000), Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) and Galenianos, Kircher,
and Virag (forthcoming) as just a few examples with search frictions). Even if in-
dividuals do not have idiosyncratic taste for or skill in various careers we may
still see deviations from perfect sorting if individuals do not have access to the full
range of income risk options.
Regardless of the source of this risk-based mismatch, we can identify from our
model the total welfare cost of income risk for each individual in terms of its log-
certainty equivalent (1
2
× γ̃i × σ2c ). Note that holding the marginal distributions of
γ̃i and σ2c fixed the average welfare cost of risk is minimized under perfect sorting,
with individuals with the lowest γ̃i taking careers with the highest σ2c . We can then
compare the average welfare cost of income risk in the data to this perfect sorting
benchmark. The difference between them measures the social cost of the mismatch
of risk-averse people into risky careers.
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In the data, the average value of 1
2
× γ̃i × σ2c is 0.1245, so that on average in-
dividuals would be willing to give up 12.45% of their income (in log terms) to
eliminate income risk. Under the counterfactual of perfect sorting, the average
value is 0.0657 (6.57% of income in log terms). The difference, 0.0588 (5.88% of
income in log terms), can be viewed as the potential welfare gain associated with
eliminating the mismatch of risk-averse people into risky careers. In the context of
a model with search, 5.88% is the welfare gain associated with eliminating search
frictions.
One desirable feature of our model is its robustness to randomly incomplete
menus. When εi,c has an extreme value distribution (as discussed in Section 2.3),
estimates of β will be unaffected by individuals observing only a random subset
of the full risk-return menu, so long as for every risk value available under the
full menu there is a career in the restricted menu with a risk value to which it
is arbitrarily close. When εi,c are not extreme value distributed, we also require
that the number of options in this restricted menu goes to infinity. Fewer draws
from the risk-return menu affect only the expectation of the optimal career, not the
degree of risk-based mismatch. For search frictions to affect estimates of β, such
frictions must make entire income risk ranges unavailable to some individuals.
6 Conclusion
This paper has documented that those who self-identify as risk-averse are more
likely to have volatile incomes, but that this correlation, while negative, is far from
−1. Our model of optimal career choice gives this correlation an economic inter-
pretation: an individual’s perceived idiosyncratic taste for and/or skill in a career
varies dramatically from one career to another. The presence of an income gap
between high- and low-risk careers for more risk-averse people – relative to more
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risk-tolerant ones – indicates that some or all of this variation is idiosyncratic skill
in one career over another, not just idiosyncratic taste for one career over another.
The results presented here have important implications for on-the-job training,
and more generally for investment in human capital. Individuals choose the career
with the best fit, the career which jointly maximizes their enjoyment of and skill in
that career. Training individuals in careers they would not otherwise choose will
have little, if any, benefit, as any randomly chosen career is likely to be far worse
than the best one.
A Appendix
A.1 The Expected Value of a Chosen Career
If x is an extreme value distributed (Type 1, Gumbel) random variable, with lo-
cation parameter µ and scale parameter β, the CDF is given by F (x | µ, β) =
e−e
−(x−µ)/β . Imagine that x is formed as the maximum of a collection of i.i.d ex-
treme value distributed random variables. Let r be a subset containing a share sr
of this collection, then the maximum value within r will have the CDF:
Fr(x | µr, βr) = (F (x | µ, β))sr = (e−e
−(x−µ)/β
)sr (36)
= e−e
−(x−µ−β ln(sr)/β
= F (x | µ+ β ln(sr), β). (37)
The expected value of the maximum of x is µ + βγem, which implies the sub-
set r has an expected maximum value of µ + β ln(sr) + βγem. Given that εi,c has
an extreme value distribution in each sr (as defined on page 15), this informs the
following transformation:
W (i, r) ≡ max
c∈r
V (i, c) = max
c∈r
[yIi + y
C
c + v
(
xIi , x
C
c
)
− 1
2
γ̃iσ
2
c + εi,c]; (38)
= yIi + y
C
c + v
(
xIi , x
C
c
)
− 1
2
γ̃iσ
2
c +max
c∈r
εi,c; (39)
W (i, r) = yIi + y
C
c + v
(
xIi , x
C
c
)
− 1
2
γ̃iσ
2
r + EV (µ+ β ln(sr), β); (40)
W (i, r) = µ+ βγem + y
I
i + β ln(sre
(yCc +v(xIi ,xCc )− 12 γ̃iσ2r)/β) + EV (−βγem, β) , 23 (41)
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where equation (41) follows from pulling β ln(sr) out of the expectation, adding/subtracting
βγem, and combining terms.
With equation (41) in hand, we can compute analytically the probability that a
given range sr will produce the maximum value. In particular, define:
Zr ≡ a+ β ln (sr) + EV (−βγem, β) (42)
sr = prob (Zr > Zs,∀s 6= r) ;
∑
r
sr = 1 (43)
Combining equations (41) and (43) gives the probability that an individuals
preferred career will lie in range r:
prob(W (i, r) > W (i, q),∀q 6= r) = sre
(yCr +v(xIi ,xCr )− 12 γ̃iσ2r)/β∑
q sqe
(yCq +v(xIi ,xCq )− 12 γ̃iσ2q )/β
. (44)
The probability that a given range will have the highest value (equation 44) is
nothing more than the pdf, the joint distribution of attributes XC of careers chosen
given i:
f(XC | i) ≡ prob(W (i, r) > W (i, q), ∀q 6= r)
We re-write equation (44) by taking the size of each range to zero, so that the
sums become integrals and sr becomes fC(XC):
f(XC | XI) = f(X
C |γ̃ = 0, XI)e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2∫∫∫∫
XCq
f(XCq |γ̃ = 0, XI)e
− 1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2qdXCq
, (45)
f(XC | γ̃ = 0, XI) = f
C(XC)e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)∫∫∫∫
XCq
fC(XCq )e
((yC+v(xI ,xC))/β)dXCq
(46)
The result is equations (16) and (17) on page 16.
A.2 Integrating Out Unobservables
The main career attribute of interest is σ2c ; we want to express the distribution of
chosen income risk in terms of only observables. We begin by restating equations
23Note that the extreme value distribution (EV) in equation (41) has mean zero. As C increases, µ
increases by ln(ln(NC)). We envision a limiting setting in which for all c, yC falls at this same rate.
Therefore, lim
NC→∞
µ + yCr converges to a constant. As the number of careers increases, the average
quality of a randomly chosen career falls to keep the expected quality of the best career constant.
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(16) and (17) as:
f(XC | XI) = f(X
C |γ̃ = 0, XI)e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2∫∫∫∫
XCq
f(XCq |γ̃ = 0, XI)e
− 1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2qdXCq
, (47)
f(XC | γ̃ = 0, XI) = f
C(XC)e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)∫∫∫∫
XCq
fC(XCq )e
((yC+v(xI ,xC))/β)dXCq
, (48)
which taken together imply that:
f(XC | XI) = k1
(
XI
)
fC(XC)e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2 ; (49)
k1
(
XI
)
≡ 1∫∫∫∫
XCq
fC(XC)e((yC+v(xI ,xC))/β)e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2dXCq
. (50)
We then integrate equation (49) over yC and xCU to obtain the marginal distribu-
tion:
f(σ2, xCO | XI) =
∫∫
k1
(
XI
)
fC(XC)e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2dyCdxCU (51)
= k1
(
XI
)
fC(σ2, xCO)
∫∫
fC(yC , xCU |σ2, xCO)e((yC+v(xI ,xC))/β)e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2dyCdxCU .
(52)
Equation (52) results from pulling k1 and fC(σ2, xCO) out of the integral, since they
do not depend on yC or xCU . We can then write the double integral in equation
(52) as an expectation over yC and xCU :
E
[
e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2|σ2, xCO, XI
]
, (53)
in which case equation (52) becomes:
f(σ2, xCO | XI) ∝ fC(σ2, xCO)E
[
e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2 |σ2, xCO, XI
]
. (54)
Conditioning on xCO using Bayes’ rule, equation (54) becomes:
f(σ2 | xCO, XI) ∝ f
C(σ2, xCO)
f (xCO)
E
[
e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2 |σ2, xCO, XI
]
⇒ f(σ2 | xCO, XI) ∝ fC(σ2|xCO)f
C(xCO)
f (xCO)
E
[
e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2|σ2, xCO, XI
]
.
(55)
So far, we have transformed equations (47) and (48) into equation 55 without
additional assumptions. Next, we want to write equation (55) as a shift of choices
made by risk-neutral individuals, meaning we want to take e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2 out of the ex-
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pectation. To do so, we must make the following assumption:
E
[
e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2|σ2, xCO, XI
]
=E
[
e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)|σ2, xCO, XI , γ̃ = 0
]
e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2 . (56)
If σ2 and e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β) are correlated (so that risky jobs have more or less ap-
pealing other attributes), this must be equally true for all γ. Plugging the assump-
tion from equation (56) into equation (55) yields the distribution of risk choices for
risk-neutral individuals (imposing γ̃ = 0) and for risk-averse individuals relative
to risk-neutral individuals:
f(σ2 | xCO, XI , γ̃ = 0) ∝ fC(σ2|xCO)f
C(xCO)
f (xCO)
× E
[
e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)|σ2, xCO, XI , γ̃ = 0
]
, (57)
f(σ2 | xCO, XI , γ̃) ∝ f(σ2 | xCO, XI , γ̃ = 0)e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2 (58)
To this point, we have integrated out career-specific unobservables, transform-
ing equations (16) and (17) into equations (57) and (58). Next, we integrate out
unobservable individual attributes. To do so, we separate XI into its constituent
parts, re-writing equation (58) as:
f(σ2 | xCO, yI , γ̃, xIO, xIU) ∝
fC(σ2|xCO)f
C(xCO)
f (xCO)
E
[
e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)|σ2, xCO, XI , γ̃ = 0
]
e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2 . (59)
Using Bayes’ rule, we transform equation (59) into the joint distribution of σ2 and
xIU (dropping yI since it affects all careers equally):
f(σ2, xIU | xCO, γ̃, xIO) ∝ fC(σ2|xCO)f
C(xCO)
f (xCO)
f(xIU | γ̃, xIO, xCO)
× E
[
e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)|σ2, xCO, XI , γ̃ = 0
]
e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2 , (60)
or equivalently:
f(σ2, xIU | xCO, γ̃, xIO) = k2
(
xCO, γ̃, xIO
)
fC(σ2|xCO)f
C(xCO)
f (xCO)
f(xIU | γ̃, xIO, xCO)
× E
[
e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)|σ2, xCO, XI , γ̃ = 0
]
e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2 ; (61)
k2
(
xCO, γ̃, xIO
)
≡
∫∫  fC(σ2|xCO)fC(xCO)f(xCO) f(xIU | γ̃, xIO, xCO)
×E
[
e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)|σ2, xCO, XI , γ̃ = 0
]
e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2
 dσ2dxIU
−1
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We then integrate over individual unobservables (xIU ):
f(σ2 | xCO, γ̃, xIO) =
∫
k2
(
xCO, γ̃, xIO
)
fC(σ2|xCO)f
C(xCO)
f (xCO)
× f(xIU | γ̃, xIO, xCO)E
[
e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)|σ2, xCO, XI , γ̃ = 0
]
e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2dxIU (62)
⇒ f(σ2 | xCO, γ̃, xIO) = k2
(
xCO, γ̃, xIO
)
fC(σ2|xCO)f
C(xCO)
f (xCO)
e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2
×
∫
f(xIU | γ̃, xIO, xCO)E
[
e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)|σ2, xCO, XI , γ̃ = 0
]
dxIU (63)
In order to write the integral over xIU as a part of expectation, we need to impose
the following assumption:∫
f(xIU | γ̃, xIO, xCO)E
[
e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)|σ2, xCO, XI , γ̃ = 0
]
dxIU
=E
[
e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)|σ2, xCO, xIO, γ̃ = 0
]
. (64)
Assumption (64) means that the expected value of careers at various income risk
levels cannot be differentially affected by individual unobservables for different
levels of risk aversion. In this case, we arrive at the final expression for f(σ2 |
xCO, γ̃, xIO):
f(σ2 | xCO, γ̃ = 0, xIO) ∝ fC(σ2|xCO)f
C(xCO)
f (xCO)
× E
[
e((y
C+v(xI ,xC))/β)|σ2, xCO, xIO, γ̃ = 0
]
, (65)
f(σ2 | xCO, γ̃, xIO) ∝ f(σ2 | xCO, γ̃ = 0, xIO)e−
1
2
1
β
γ̃σ2 . (66)
Equations (65) and (66) are identical to equations (20) and (21) on page 17.
References
ABOWD, J., AND D. CARD (1989): “On the Covariance Structure of Earnings and
Hours Changes,” Econometrica, 57(2), 411–445.
ALVAREZ, J., M. BROWNING, AND M. EJRNAES (2001): “Modelling income pro-
cesses with lots of heterogeneity,” University of Copenhagen Working Paper.
BARSKY, R. B., F. T. JUSTER, M. S. KIMBALL, AND M. D. SHAPIRO (1997): “Pref-
erence Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity: An Experimental Approach
in the Health and Retirement Study,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2), 537–
579.
43
BEN-AKIVA, M., N. LITINAS, AND K. TSUNOKAWA (1985): “Continuous Spatial
Choice: The Continuous Logit Model and Distribution of Trips and Urban Den-
sities,” Transportation Research Part A: General, 19A(2), 119–154.
BERKHOUT, P., J. HARTOG, AND D. WEBBINK (2006): “Compensation for Earnings
Risk under Worker Heterogeneity,” IZA Discussion Paper 2074.
BOSKIN, M. (2004): “A Conditional Logit Model of Occupational Choice,” Journal
of Political Economy, 82(2), 389–398.
CARROLL, C. D., AND A. A. SAMWICK (1997): “The Nature of Precautionary
Wealth,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 40(1), 41–71.
COUCH, K. A., AND D. W. PLACZEK (2010): “Earnings Losses of Displaced Work-
ers Revisited,” American Economic Review, 100(1), 572–589.
DE HAAN, L., AND A. FERREIRA (2006): Extreme Value Theory: An Introduction.
Springer.
DELEIRE, T., AND H. LEVY (2004): “Worker Sorting and the Risk of Death on the
Job,” Journal of Labor Economics, 22(4), 925–953.
DIAZ-SERRANO, L., AND J. HARTOG (2006): “Is There a Risk-Return Trade-off in
Educational Choices? Evidence from Spain,” Investigaciones Economicas, 30(2),
353–380.
FIELD, E. (2009): “Educational Debt Burden and Career Choice: Evidence from
a Financial Aid Experiment at NYU Law School,” American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics, 1(1), 1–21.
FLYER, F. A. (2004): “The Influence of Higher Moments of Earnings Distributions
on Career Decisions,” Journal of Labor Economics, 15(4), 689–713.
FROST, R. (1920): The Road Not TakenHenry Holt and Company.
GALENIANOS, M., P. KIRCHER, AND G. VIRAG (forthcoming): “Market Power and
Efficiency in a Search Model,” International Economic Review.
GOTTSCHALK, P., AND R. MOFFITT (2002): “Trends in the Transitory Variance of
Earnings in the United States,” Economic Journal, 112, C68–73.
HARRIS, M., AND Y. WEISS (1984): “Job Matching with Finite Horizon and Risk
Aversion,” Journal of Political Economy, 92(4), 758–779.
HARTOG, J. (2009): “A Risk Augmented Mincer Earnings Equation? Taking
Stock,” IZA Discussion Paper 4439.
HARTOG, J., E. PLUG, L. DIAZ-SERRANO, AND J. VIEIRA (2003): “Risk Compen-
sation in Wages, a Replication,” Empirical Economics, 28(3), 639–647.
44
HARTOG, J., AND W. VIJVERBERG (2007): “On Compensation for Risk Aversion
and Skewness Affection in Wages,” Labour Economics, 14(6), 938–956.
HILL, M. S. (1991): The Panel Study of Income Dynamics: A User’s Guide, vol. 2. Sage
Publications, Inc.
HOLLAND, P. W. (1986): “Statistics and Causal Inference,” Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 81(396), 945–960.
JACOBS, B., J. HARTOG, AND W. VIJVERBERG (2009): “Self-Selection Bias in Esti-
mated Wage Premiums for Earnings Risk,” Empirical Economics, 37(2), 271–286.
JACOBSON, L. S., R. J. LALONDE, AND D. G. SULLIVAN (1993): “Earnings Losses
of Displaced Workers,” American Economic Review, 83(4), 685–709.
(2005): “Estimating the Returns to Community College Schooling for Dis-
placed Workers,” Journal of Econometrics, 125(1-2), 271–304.
JENSEN, S. T., AND S. H. SHORE (2009a): “The Evolution of the Distribution of
Income Volitility,” Working Paper, Johns Hopkins University.
(2009b): “Semi-Parametric Bayesian Modeling of Income Volatility Hetero-
geneity and Dynamics,” Working Paper, Johns Hopkins University.
KEANE, M., AND K. WOLPIN (1997): “The Career Decisions of Young Men,” Journal
of Political Economy, 105(3), 473–522.
KIMBALL, M. S., C. R. SAHM, AND M. D. SHAPIRO (2008): “Imputing Risk Toler-
ance from Survey Responses,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 103,
1028–1038.
(2009): “Risk Preferences in the PSID: Individual Imputations and Family
Covariation,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 99, 363–368.
KREBS, T. (2003): “Human Capital Risk and Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 118(2), 709–744.
LALONDE, R. J. (1995): “The Promise of Public Sector-Sponsored Training Pro-
grams,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(2), 149–168.
LEVHARI, D., AND Y. WEISS (1974): “The Effect of Risk on the Investment in Hu-
man Capital,” American Economic Review, 64(6), 950–963.
LUCAS, R. E., AND E. C. PRESCOTT (1974): “Equilibrium Search and Unemploy-
ment,” Journal of Economic Theory, (7), 188–209.
MCFADDEN, D. (1974): “Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Bea,”
Frontiers in Econometrics, ed. by P. Zarembka, pp. 105–142.
45
MEGHIR, C., AND L. PISTAFERRI (2004): “Income Variance Dynamics and Hetero-
geneity,” Econometrica, 72(1), 1–32.
MINCER, J. (1974): Schooling, Experience and Earnings. Columbia University Press.
MONTEIRO, G. (1988): Robert Frost and the New England Renaissance. The University
Press of Kentucky.
MORTENSEN, D. T., AND C. A. PISSARIDES (1994): “Job Creation and Job Destruc-
tion in the Theory of Unemployment,” Review of Economic Studies, 61(3), 397–415.
PACIOS-HUERTA, I. (2003): “An Empirical Analysis of the Risk Properties of Hu-
man Capital Returns,” American Economic Review, 93(3), 948–964.
PISSARIDES, C. A. (2000): Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
PISTAFERRI, L. (2002): “Anticipated and Unanticipated Wage Changes, Wage Risk,
and Intertemporal Labor Supply,” Journal of Labor Economics, 21(3).
PRITCHARD, W. (1984): Frost: A Literary Life Reconsidered. Oxford University Press.
ROBERTSON, D., AND J. SYMONS (1990): “The Occupational Choice of British Chil-
dren,” The Economic Journal, 100(402), 828–841.
ROGERSON, R., R. SHIMER, AND R. WRIGHT (2005): “Search-Theoretic Models of
the Labor Market: A Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature, 43(4), 959–988.
RUHM, C. J. (1991): “Are Workers Permanently Scarred by Job Displacements?,”
American Economic Review, 81(1), 319–324.
SAHM, C. (2007): “How Much Does Risk Tolerance Change?,” Federal Reserve
Board Working Paper.
SIOW, A. (1984): “Occupational Choice Under Uncertainty,” Econometrica, 52(3),
631–645.
STINEBRICKNER, T. R. (2001): “Compensation Policies and Teacher Decisions,”
International Economic Review, 42(3), 751–779.
WEISS, Y. (1972): “The Risk Element in Occupational and Educational Choices,”
Journal of Political Economy, 80(6), 1203–1213.
WILLIS, R., AND S. ROSEN (1979): “Education and Self-Selection,” Journal of Politi-
cal Economy, 87(5), S7–S36.
46
